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1. INTRODUCTION
There are occasions in scholarly life where a controversy is initiated that endures for
generations. “The Two Cultures” by C. P. Snow published in 1959, extended
subsequently by the author to include yet a third, mediating culture of “social
historians,” 1 constitutes such a foray. William Rehg has visited this exchange to examine
Snow’s contextual presuppositions found in distinguishing scientific from literary
cultures. He observes that the making of public argument is “conditioned by the culture
context” in which positions are advanced, understood, criticized and defended. This
insight extends Snow to the study of argument cultures. Importantly, Professor Rehg
draws attention to the relationships between these scientific and literary constellations as
well as there differences. Indeed, in Rehg’s view, Snow’s most important contribution is
to recognize the need “for greater communication between the two cultures,” as well as to
investigate the “affective and evaluative aspects of argument cultures that undermine
such communication.” Thus, “Two Cultures” invites communicative repair work into
uncertain relationships between science and technological practice on the one side, and
literary production and critical ambitions on the other. Hope is restored when a path is
fashioned from disrespect between the cultures to a productive state of “heterogonous
solidarity.”
2. EXPLICATING CULTURES OF ARGUMENT
In Rehg’s reading, Snow’s cultures are a two-sided coin offering a space for “intellectual
development” and “a way of life” shared in “social practices.” 2 A culture is a social body
that may be understood anthropologically in its production of common ways of reasoning
and exchange. At the same time an argument culture can be regarded normatively as
putting at stake claims bound-by-context—that invite thinking both within and against its
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boundaries. Thus, Snow’s two cultures are differentiated by characteristic styles,
“culture-specific emotional attitudes, assumptions about the human condition, and visions
of the good society.” An argument culture is a coalesced, practice-embedded aesthetic,
axiological, and ethical communicative space where what are offered as supported, or
even interesting, reason-validated claims are called to account. These do indeed appear
the categories from which Snow is working out of his experiences as an author and
involvement with organizing scientific personnel during the Second World War. Whether
they are necessary and sufficient categories to identify and distinguish between science
and literature as cultures generally or argument cultures overall is an issue that remains to
be addressed. Nevertheless, the recognition that an argument culture is a multidimensional communicative space is important.
3. WHAT WE HAVE HERE IS A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE
The contextual study of communication appears to me to be compatible with the idea of
bounded communicative rationality. Bounded rationality is a human condition which
admits to our imperfect abilities to master all relevant information when coming to a
judgment, decision, or verdict. 3 Individually limited, humans sometimes turn to assemble
communities of knowledge acquisition and use. Such cultures are constituted in bounded
communication practices. Argument
cultures depend upon social-institutional sites, whether these are formally institutionalized or
merely informal gathering places, where members can come together and sustain their identi[ty] as
members of the culture in question,

Rehg observes. 4 Intersubjective understandings are acquired and developed within the
context of institutional identifications for and within which specialists train, network,
develop, and practice.
The boundaries of a culture are distinguished by domains of attractive problems
and tasty solutions. Snow’s preference appears to be for the sweet parsimony of a
scientific endeavour, well-directed by a controlled solution to a nettling problem. An
aesthetic of moving from reserved anticipation, to the excitement of discovery, to the
equanimity of testing results and tracking further inference is a quiet drama that
reinforces progressive cultural projects. In contrast, the unsettling styles of literary
authorship leave little but dissatisfactions in their wake. Romantic replies to the industrial
revolution spread dissatisfaction that slows progress down, when it but needs to be
speeded up. Modernist indwelling on literary form shakes the world loose further from its
practical bearings. In either case, practices of literary culture slip from social-institutional
bearings and fail to inform of anything other than the egotism of the artist, at least
according to Snow.
The combination of work and reward, in Rehg’s view, explains why Snow’s essay
drives toward competing visions of the good society. Roughly, Snow appears to draw
from science in the era of classical economics where solutions to social ills resided in
scientifically discovered, technological enabled collective capacities to overcome nature’s
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stingy boundaries. The overall longevity of life and swelling populations enhanced by
scientific discovery and technological application, underscores Snow’s point even if the
master narrative of progress is no longer powerful. If the benefits of science are not
shared, however, it may not be the fault of those who expand nature’s cornucopia Snow
could reply. Still, science and technology must make investments in research and link
findings to clinical practice and social development. If literature can but celebrate its own
aesthetic practices and engage in critical flailing, then the humanities cannot offer to
science and technology insight or guidance on its choices.
The responsibility for absence of such a language, in Snow’s judgment, is clearly
one way. Snow cannot resist condemning twentieth century writers as not only
“politically silly, but politically wicked.” He cannot answer in the negative the question
of whether “the influence of all they represent br[ought] Auschwitz that much nearer?” 5
He does not come close to mentioning Hiroshima or Nagasaki that ushered in a Cold War
of progressively greater terror embedded in the science of cybernetics and the practice of
game theory. Instead, Snow invokes the abstract formula of nuclear fission as having
potential for evil or for good. 6 At the same time, he is aware that with such growing
power, the risks of bad scientific advice among possible choices could have disastrous
consequences, and that “decision-makers” have no capacity or reliable cultural methods
to test whether scientific advice “is good or bad.” 7 Indeed, his own lack of balance in
judging twentieth century science and literature appears to reflect the very “little fellow
feeling” and outright “hostility” of which he warns. 8 Indeed, his belated recognition of a
place at all for a third culture, the social sciences speaks to the absence of a full
discussion of the development of a mediating position between the two.
Professor Rehg diagnoses three causes of ill-will between argument cultures and
offers correctives that promise to open collaborative spaces among argument cultures.
Drawing from Snow, these appear to be communicative spaces where an ethos is
cultivated among members, educated into a practice, who interact in a social or
institutional setting by deploying elements of reasoning, exchange and debate according
to standards of cogency developed within a vision of a good society—an argument
culture.
4. CORRECTING HUBRIS
Science breeds confidence, but excessive optimism is not a good in itself—especially
when accompanied by an outlook that demeans other, independent communities of
reasoning.
The affective aspect of a cultural ethos makes it understandable that members could tend to
develop a particular conception of the common good for a whole society, in which their
contribution would play the central or most necessary role,
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Rehg concludes. 9 If this premise is true, then literature can and should provide a
corrective that makes articulate the unanticipated consequences of what appears to be
good within a technical boundary.
Such depictions constitute contexts for evaluating scientists’ claims about the benefits of some
proposed technology, or claims about the importance of a line of research. They bring abstract
scientific arguments and statistics down to the earth of concrete human experience,

he writes. 10
I would add that the critical imaginary need not create only a language within
which the past is remembered or the present rendered articulate. The literary imaginary
can reach to conditions not yet realized, thereby creating a spur to scientists and engineers
to research, invent, and produce new work. Katherine Hayles dwells on the link between
literary constructions of worlds yet real and the directions of cybernetics and the
communication revolutions of the 21st century. 11 Indeed, with human bodies intersecting
with information systems and technologies, it becomes increasingly difficult to sort out
two cultures, even as critical literary efforts can imagine the tensions that abide and pull
in the choices to become (post)human.
5. ISSUES OF TRANSLATION
The benefits of science cannot be presupposed to flow robustly from theory to discovery
to technology and into clinical practice, even though such transferral may generate
optimal effects for individual and collective uses. Rehg requests that cultures be brought
into dialogue so that each understands the capacity and limits of the other. The need for
such a project in medicine is recognized by the National Institute of Health in the United
States. The gaps between growth in technical capabilities, clinical practices, and public
knowledge should be repaired by attention to translation duties among different levels of
judgment and expertise. Clinical practices are evolving as panels of experts assemble and
translate arguments into evaluative spaces for judgment on the part of physicians and
participation by patients. Milos Jenick and David Hitchcock have been at work
developing evidence-based practices of medicine. 12 While it is well that two-cultures
retain some distance, the discovery of practices through translation of context-bounded
knowledge resulting in collaborative communication and informed judgment appears to
be promising. 13
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6. COSTS OF COLLABORATION
Finally, Rehg turns his attention to transforming clashes among cultures to the power of
“multidisciplinary advisory committee” structures which themselves could found a
heterogeneous argument culture. Such groups could engage in regulatory work that
would set common standards across subspecialties of the sciences. The ideal of consensus
and respect for science may produce incentives. However, such groups would be
characterized by common cause more than common ground. New argument cultures raise
questions of trust and legitimacy, over and against the social institutions that train,
credential, and reward participation within social structures that reward specialization of
practice and expert knowledge. Indeed, collaboration itself is a risky business in so far as
pressures to find workable solutions may obscure the costs of error and the distribution of
benefits. Greater power in triangulated interests does not necessarily result in better
visions of a common good. Collaboration is one way of overcoming the antipathy that
characterizes two cultures, but its risks and rewards need to be plumbed further.
7. ARGUMENT CULTURES AND THE OTHER
In the spirit of Rehg’s extension from “Two Cultures” to an understanding of argument
cultures more generally, I offer an addition. In its most fundamental sense, an argument
culture is a productive, architectonic, social and intellectual space for reasoned assertion
and exchange. Yet, part of the culture’s project includes the imagination and positioning
of spaces that do not reside within its own enlightened boundaries. More, such distancing
is internalized by participants who remember how far the culture has come since its
inception and think about how far it has yet to go. Thus, each argument culture is defined
by its outlooks for self and for others. The other to the culture consist of (1) individuals or
groups relevant to but not credential by the culture, and (2) generations whose work is
held not be within the scope of present best practices. Snow’s contribution was to
recognize the danger in leaving attitudes toward the other unaccounted; Rehg’s reading
leads to reflection on repair work among cultural relationships by taking into account the
benefits of hospitality, translation, and collaboration across cultures. I would add that
communicative engagement with the other, not of the culture, constitutes a reflective
space within each culture (whether fully reflected upon or simply taken for granted),
including
(i) that which is reasonably beyond the boundaries of a participant culture
(ii) communication which enables and limits understanding of risk and
uncertainty between cultures,
(iii) those situations which invite collaboration in the translation of overlapping
work or prompt contestation for competing grants of legitimacy
(iv) dialectical tensions within the culture that call for strengthening boundaries
or
opening routes of exchange across topics and situations.
Further, the other of an argument culture may be placed in the continuity and
discontinuity among past, present, and future spaces within a culture when standards of
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reason, evidence, debate, and claim change through controversy. Snow’s “Two Cultures”
illustrates how post war science imagined literature and pre war literature imagined
science, to the great loss of both.
Link to paper
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